

# seL4® verification: status and plans

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#### The world's most highly assured operating system kernel



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Unparalleled mathematical proofs of correctness and security

⇒ The most trustworthy foundation
for safety- and security-critical systems





# Unparalleled mathematical proofs of correctness and security











#### Unparalleled mathematical proofs of correctness and security (integrity&confidentiality)





# Unparalleled mathematical proofs of correctness and security

#### NOW & IN THE FUTURE



More features verified

More platforms verified

More cores



Less need for expertise & maintenance



## Overview: 5 main areas Proofcraft is working on

More architectures verified

More features verified

More platforms verified

Arm 64-bit (AArch64)

Mixed-criticality support (MCS)

Automated platform port verification

Less need for expertise & maintenance

Proof architecture split (arch-split)

More cores

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Done: abstract invariants Now: refinement proofs







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#### x86 64-bit

#### seL4 proofs Done Ongoing Future

(non-MCS, unicore)

#### RISC-V 64-bit

Done: FC Now: integrity (Q1'25)





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- Time as a resource scheduling context objects 









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MCS is different:

large, invasive change



### Big Feature: Mixed-Criticality Systems







# Verification of multiple configs in parallel









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- New invariants required, pre-existing invariants impacted
- Many new functions in the kernel (in particular, new system calls)
- Many pre-existing functions are now much longer









Time























Problem...

















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Data refinement? Ring buffer of refills versus list of refills







### Conclusion



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#### https://proofcraft.systems





